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Probable Cause Means Probable Cause:
Why the Circuit Courts Should Uniformly
Require Officers to Establish Probable Cause
for Every Element of an Offense
Corbin Houstont

I. INTRODUCTION

Historically, some of the most divisive Fourth Amendment issues
stemmed from the conflicting interests imbedded within the
Amendment. When drafting the Fourth Amendment, the Framers
sought to protect individuals from arbitrary government interference,
while still preserving the State's security interest in maintaining law
and order.' The development of the probable cause concept was one of
the most direct ways courts balanced these competing interests. While
many of the nuances of probable cause are settled law, there still
remains much ambiguity surrounding the doctrine's application by law
enforcement in the area of warrantless arrests.
In Adams v. Williams,2 the Supreme Court concluded that
"[p]robable cause does not require the same type of specific evidence of
each element of the offense as would be needed to support a
conviction." 3 Significantly, Adams did not address whether "probable
cause can exist without at least some evidence of every element of a
suspected crime."4 In the forty years following Adams, a circuit split
developed over this question. The Fourth, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits
hold that an officer need not establish probable cause for each element
of an offense in order to make a warrantless arrest (hereafter, the

t B.A. 2011, Indiana University; J.D. Candidate 2017, The University of Chicago
Law School. I would like to thank Professor Jonathan Masur for his invaluable assistance in his
role as my faculty advisor. I would also like to thank the Legal Forum Editorial Board for helping
shape this Comment.
' Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 178 (1984); Maryland v. Pringle, 540 U.S. 366, 370
(2003).
2 407 U.S. 143 (1972).
Id. at 149.
United States v. Argueta-Mejia, 615 F. App'x 485, 490 n.8 (10th Cir. 2015).
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some-elements approach). 5 Conversely, the Third, Sixth, Eighth, and
D.C. Circuits hold that probable cause must extend to every element of
an offense, including mens rea (hereafter, the all-elements approach). 6
Probable cause is a concept derived from the protections of the
Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution.7 As such,
probable cause should have a nationally uniform definition. That
uniform definition should be the all-elements approach. The allelements approach best balances the competing interests of the Fourth
Amendment, while satisfying the nontechnical definition of probable
cause established in Supreme Court precedent.
Probable cause is ultimately a probability standard above all else.
The absence of probable cause for any one element decreases the
overall probability that the crime is being committed below the
probable cause threshold. The some-elements approach deviates from
the basic probability assessment of probable cause by not requiring
probable cause for each element. Conversely, the all-elements approach
maintains logical consistency with this mathematical understanding.
Under the all-elements approach, when an officer lacks probable cause
for any element, he lacks probable cause for the entire crime.
Furthermore, forcing officers to credibly establish probable cause
for each element prior to arrest does not impose some technical
standard that prevents application to various circumstances. The allelements approach does not require specific evidence of each element,
only a sufficient probability that an officer will find direct evidence
following arrest. Thus, rather than decreasing law enforcement's
effectiveness, the all-elements approach allows flexibility in law
enforcement practices while maintaining a logical consistency with the
probability aspect of probable cause.
This Comment first tracks the development of the probable cause
standard for warrantless arrests. Next, it details the development of
the some-elements approach and the all-elements approach. Finally,
this Comment argues that the circuit courts should uniformly adopt the
all-elements approach. While a Supreme Court ruling on the issue is
the easiest route to uniform definition, the Court is hesitant to provide

5 Cilman v. Reeves, 452 F. App'x 263, 270-71 (4th Cir. 2011); Spiegel v. Cortese, 196 F.3d
717, 724 n.1 (7th Cir. 1999); Gasho v. United States, 39 F.3d 1420, 1428 (9th Cir. 1994).
6 Williams v. City of Alexander, Ark., 772 F.3d 1307, 1312 (8th Cir. 2014); Wesby v. District
of Columbia, 765 F.3d 13, 20 (D.C. Cir. 2014); United States v. Joseph, 730 F.3d 336, 342 (3d Cir.
2013); Thacker v. City of Columbus, 328 F.3d 244, 256 (6th Cir. 2003).
U.S. CONST. amend. IV ("The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no
Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause .... ).
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any sort of clarification. The closest the Supreme Court has come to

addressing this issue was in a dissenting opinion thirty years ago.8
Thus, the circuit courts should uniformly adopt the all-elements
approach because the approach: (1) better adheres to the widely held
understanding of probable cause as a measure of probability, (2) aligns
with the nontechnical definition of probable cause established in
Supreme Court precedent, (3) better balances the competing interests
of the Fourth Amendment, (4) avoids the linguistic inconsistency that
precipitated the circuit split, and (5) accommodates more policy
concerns.
II. DEVELOPMENT OF THE PROBABLE CAUSE STANDARD FOR
WARRANTLESS ARRESTS

The application of the probable cause standard to warrantless
arrests emerged in the middle of the nineteenth century. 9 Still, an exact
definition of probable cause eluded courts well into the twentieth
century. In the 1925 decision Carroll v. United States,10 the Supreme
Court held that probable cause exists where "the facts and
circumstances within [the arresting officers'] knowledge and of which
they had reasonably trustworthy information [are] sufficient in
themselves to warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that
[an offense has been or is being committed]."' Nearly twenty-five years
later, the Court added to the Carroll definition in Brinegar v. United
States.12 There, the Court noted, "In dealing with probable cause . . we
deal with probabilities. These are not technical; they are the factual
and practical considerations of everyday life on which reasonable and
prudent men, not legal technicians, act." 13
Scholars have wrestled with finding a working definition of "nontechnical" since the Court's decision in Brinegar. In 'Case-by-Case
Adjudication' Versus 'Standardized Procedures': The Robinson
Dilemma, Professor Wayne R. LaFave argued that "Fourth Amendment

See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242 (1986).
See generally Wesley MacNeil Oliver, The Modern History of Probable Cause, 78 TENN. L.
REV. 377, 379 (2011) (arguing that "[t]he modern notion of probable cause ... developed as society
called for, and came to accept, modern police forces"); Thomas Y. Davies, How the Post-Framing
Adoption of the Bare-Probable Cause Standard Drastically Expanded Government Arrest and
Search Power, 73 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 1, 1 (2010) ("[T]he notion that bare probable cause that
a crime might have been committed suffices to justify a warrantless arrest, or issuance of an

arrest warrant, dates back only to roughly the middle of the nineteenth century.").
1o
267 U.S. 132 (1925).
Id. at 162.
12 338 U.S. 160 (1949).
13

Id. at 175.
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doctrine .. . is primarily intended to regulate the police in their day-today activities and thus ought to be expressed in terms that are readily
applicable by the police in the context of the law enforcement activities
14
in which they are necessarily engaged."
Debate lingers, however, on whether the Brinegar definition of
probable cause was probabilistic in nature, or whether at its core
probable cause was simply a reasonableness assessment. In The
Reasonableness of Probable Cause," for example, Professor Craig S.
Lerner argues that probable cause jurisprudence is really based on
reasonableness rather than probability. While this debate is largely
outside the scope of this Comment, this Comment supports the opposite
conclusion. This is because of (1) the vast scholarship that argues
against Lerner's proposition, 16 and (2) the many cases in which the
Court used language that indicates probable cause is ultimately a
17
probabilistic determination.
Regardless, Brinegar's "nontechnical" definition of probable cause
became highly influential in subsequent years. In Illinois v. Gates," for
example, the Court announced, "[P]robable cause is a fluid conceptturning on the assessment of probabilities in particular factual
contexts-not readily, or even usefully, reduced to a neat set of legal
rules."' 9 In discussing its probable cause jurisprudence, the Supreme
Court recently noted its historical rejection of "rigid rules, bright-line
tests, and mechanistic inquiries in favor of a more flexible, all-thingsconsidered approach." 20 Rather, "room must be allowed for some
mistakes on [the officers'] part." 2 1 They are, after all, only human.

1974 SUP. CT. REV. 127, 141-42.
Craig S. Lerner, The Reasonableness of Probable Cause, 81 TEX. L. REV. 951 (2003).
16 See, e.g., Ronald J. Bacigal, Making the Right Gamble: The Odds on Probable Cause,
74 MISS. L.J. 279, 314 (2004) ("[The oral arguments in Maryland v. Pringle dramatically framed
the question of expressing probable cause in mathematical terms."); Andrew Guthrie Ferguson,
Predictive Policing and Reasonable Suspicion, 62 EMORY L.J. 259, 264 ("Predicting criminal
activities based on probabilities rests at the core of Fourth Amendment concepts such as probable
cause and reasonable suspicion."); Erica Goldberg, Getting Beyond Intuition in the Probable Cause
Inquiry, 17 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 789, 806 (2013) ("[C]ourts evaluate statistical evidence in
assessing probable cause."); Max Minzner, Putting ProbabilityBack Into Probable Cause, 87 TEX.
L. REV. 913, 915 (2009) ("[T]he probable-cause determination is explicitly and exclusively a
statement about the probability of a particular outcome.").
" Maryland v. Pringle, 540 U.S. 366, 371 (2003) (affirming that probable cause is a fluid
concept, turning on the assessment of probabilities); Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 232 (1983)
("[P]robable cause is a fluid concept-turning on the assessment of probabilities.); Texas v. Brown,
460 U.S. 730, 742 (1983) ("The [probable cause] process does not deal with hard certainties, but
with probabilities."); Brinegar, 338 U.S. at 175 (holding that the determination of probable cause
for warrantless searches requires a dealing with probabilities).
14

1"

19
20
21

462 U.S. 213 (1983).
Id. at 232.
Florida v. Harris, 133 S. Ct. 1050, 1055-56 (2013).
Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 186 (1990) (quoting Brinegar, 338 U.S. at 176).
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Despite Brinegar's influential interpretation of probable cause,
courts remained confused concerning the sufficiency of evidence needed
to establish probable cause well into the 1970s. 2 2 The Supreme Court
decision that attempted to add clarity to this confusion instead added
more ambiguity. In Adams v. Williams, the Court concluded that
"[p]robable cause does not require the same type of specific evidence of
each element of the offense as would be needed to support a
conviction." 23 Rather, a court should "evaluate generally the
circumstances at the time of the arrest to decide if the officer had
probable cause for his action." 24 Significantly, Adams did not address
whether "probable cause can exist without at least some evidence of
every element of a suspected crime." 25 Adams delivered instead an
open-to-interpretation comment, which courts have wrestled with since.
To secure a conviction' for a criminal offense, the state must ordinarily
prove each element beyond reasonable doubt. According to Adams, the
evidentiary threshold for establishing probable cause for each element
is lower, but Adams did not clearly indicate how much lower. Nor did
Adams clarify whether police must establish probable cause (1) for each
element of a crime, or (2) for the crime generally, adopting a crime-inthe abstract approach.
In the forty years following Adams, a circuit split developed over
this issue. Although a plurality of circuits hold that an officer does not
need probable cause for each element of the offense to establish
probable cause for a warrantless arrest, four circuits have offered a
competing interpretation. Notably, a major reason for the split is a
simple linguistic inconsistency at the circuit level. At various moments,
often within the same opinion, courts have interchangeably used
"probability" and "specific evidence" to describe their probable cause
standards. The some-elements approach is largely driven by a
perception that requiring probable cause for each element would also
require specific evidence of each element. The all-elements approach is
largely a response to this misperception. To adherents of the allelements-approach, probable cause is a standard that requires
probability that each element is occurring but not specific evidence of
each element, or even knowledge that the specific crime allegedly
occurred.
22 See generally Washington v. Clemmer, 339 F.2d 715, 719 (D.C. Cir. 1964) (per curiam)
("The competency and sufficiency of the evidence necessary to establish probable cause depends on
the circumstances of each case."); Lerner, supra note 15, at 981-95 (analyzing "the ebb and flow of
American probable cause" in the mid-twentieth century).
23 Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 149 (1972).
24

id.

"

United States v. Argueta-Mejia, 615 F. App'x 485, 490 n.8 (10th Cir. 2015).
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III. DEVELOPMENT OF THE SOME-ELEMENTS APPROACH

One of the first cases to lay the foundation for the some-elements
approach was United States v. Sevier.2 6 The issue before the court was
"whether an affidavit for a search warrant must allege specific facts
sufficient to establish probable cause as to each and every element of
the federal crime under investigation." 27 The court, in a strategy that
would become the dominant reasoning scheme of the some-elements
approach, reached its conclusion through short and cryptic references
to policy and Supreme Court precedent. The court first noted "that in
construing affidavits for search warrants we ought not to apply
hypertechnical or rigorous standards which would frustrate the efforts
of law enforcement officials and actually prevent any enforcement of
the [relevant] statute." 28 The court then concluded, "The standard we
should use in construing affidavits for warrants does not require a
prima facie showing of each and every element of the crime, but only a
probability that a federal crime has been committed or is being
committed." 29 In further support of this conclusion, the court cited the
Supreme Court decision Beck v. Ohio.30 The Sevier court likely seized
on Beck's language that "the rule of probable cause is a practical,
nontechnical conception affording the best compromise that has been
found for accommodating . .. often opposing interests." 31
Eight years after Sevier, the Ninth Circuit applied Sevier's
principles to warrantless arrests in United States v. Thornton.32 There,
an officer had arrested the defendant after viewing a protruding
firearm under the seat of the defendant's car. 33 At issue was whether
the officer needed specific evidence that the defendant was not entitled
to possession of the gun. Under the relevant statute, it was a crime to
carry "concealed and dangerous weapons," including guns, unless the
person carrying the weapon "secur[ed] a permit from the sheriff of the
county after satisfying the sheriff of the necessity therefor." 34 The
defendant thus argued that the lack of a license was an essential
element of the crime, and without specific evidence of that element, the
officer did not have probable cause to arrest. 35 The court reasoned,
2

539 F.2d 599 (6th Cir. 1976).

2

Id. at 600.

28

Id. at 603.

29

Id. (citing Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89 (1964)).

379 U.S. 89 (1964).
379 U.S. at 91 (quoting Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 176 (1949)).
Beck,
"
32 710 F.2d 513 (9th Cir. 1983).
1 Id. at 514.
14 Idaho Code Ann. § 18-3302
(1979).
3 Thornton, 710 F.2d at
515.
0
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however, that the officer's "lack of specific evidence that [defendant]
was not entitled to possession of the gun is irrelevant." 36 Citing Adams,
the court concluded, "Probable cause does not require specific evidence
of every element of an offense."37 Notably, the court was silent on
whether the officer had or needed probable cause for the element at
issue. Thornton merely followed Sevier's lead in holding that "specific
evidence" of each element was unnecessary.
Following Thornton, the Ninth Circuit expanded the principles of
Sevier. In Gasho v. United States,3 8 the court concluded that an officer
need not establish probable cause for each element since "probable
cause must be evaluated from the perspective of prudent men, not legal
technicians." 3 9 Notably, Gasho was the first circuit court to replace the
"specific evidence" language of Adams and Sevier with "probable cause."
Gasho's move has been highly influential. Although earlier decisions
simply held that an officer need not have "specific evidence" of each"
element, subsequent courts, seizing on Gasho's language, have held
that an officer need not have "probable cause" for each element. 40
Additionally, the Gasho court modified Thornton by holding that
"when specific intent is a required element of the offense, the arresting
officer must have probable cause for that element in order to
reasonably believe that a crime has occurred." 41 The court cited no
Supreme Court decision or broader Fourth Amendment policy in
defense of this modification. The court merely reasoned that probable
cause was needed for the mens rea of specific intent crimes because "[i]t:
is fundamental that a person is not criminally responsible unless
criminal intent accompanies the wrongful act." 4 2
It does make some sense to require probable cause for the mens rea
of specific intent crimes given those crimes' heightened mens rea bar.
But ultimately, there's nothing special about specific intent crimes in
terms of probable cause. Courts generally allow a wide range of direct
and circumstantial evidence in order to prove the element of intent for
both specific and general intent crimes. 43 Furthermore, Gasho is not

`
3

Id.
Id. (citing Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 149 (1972)).
39 F.3d 1420 (9th Cir. 1994).

9 Id. at 1428 (quoting Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 176 (1949)).
See, e.g., United States v. Lopez, 482 F.3d 1067, 1072 (9th Cir. 2007).
41 Gasho, 39 F.3d at 1428 (citing Kennedy v. L.A. Police Dep't, 901 F.2d 702, 705 (9th Cir.
1989)).
42
Id. at 1429 (citing Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 251 (1952) (stating that a
crime is the "concurrence of an evil-meaning mind with an evil-doing hand")).
4 See, e.g., United States v. Balzano, 916 F.2d 1273, 1291 (7th Cir. 1990) (quoting United
States v. Johnson, 903 F.2d 1084, 1085 (7th Cir. 1990) ("In general, it is necessary to prove intent
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clear on what sort of evidence an officer may rely on to establish
probable cause for the mens rea of specific intent crimes. If the Ninth
Circuit requires an officer to have direct evidence of specific intent prior
to arrest, this is breaking the maxim that probable cause is not to serve
as a standard where police officers act as prosecutors.4 4 If Gasho simply
requires any sort of evidence to establish probable cause, it seems like
Gasho is just a step toward full adoption of the all-elements approach.
The D.C. Circuit subsequently adopted the second half of Gasho's
holding, despite that half's insufficient reasoning. In United States v.
Christian,4 5 at issue was whether the officers had probable cause to
search the defendant's vehicle based only on viewing a dagger wedged
between the vehicle's seats. 4 6 Citing heavily from Gasho, the court
concluded, "[T]he officers did not simply lack the type of specific
evidence of Christian's intent as would be needed to support
conviction . . . they lacked any evidence at all that Christian intended
to use the dagger unlawfully." 4 7 The court thus held that "without such
evidence, there was no probable cause for arrest." 48 Note that the court
in Christian replaced Gasho's probable cause language, returning to
the earlier courts' use of the term "specific evidence." In light of the
back-and-forth occurring among Adams, Sevier, Thornton, Gasho, and
Christian, it is no wonder why future courts continued to conflate the
terms "specific evidence" and "probable cause." Recently, the D.C.
Circuit has repudiated its adoption of the some-elements approach. 49 As
such, the Ninth Circuit is the only circuit to add a specific intent gloss
to the some-elements approach. Some circuits have in fact directly
repudiated this specific intent gloss. 50
During the same year in which the D.C. Circuit decided Christian,
the Seventh Circuit formally adopted the some-elements approach. In
Spiegel v. Cortese,5 1 the court summarized Seventh Circuit law as
through circumstantial evidence, and a jury may thus rely on evidence of this nature to find that a
defendant had the requisite intent to commit the crime charged.")); Felske v. State, 706 P.2d 257,
262 (Wyo. 1985) ("For general-intent crimes it must be found that the prohibited act was done
voluntarily . . . But it is unnecessary to prove intent by direct, positive and independent
evidence.").
44
See Scarbrough v. Myles, 245 F.3d 1299, 1302-03 (11th Cir. 2011).
" 187 F.3d 663 (D.C. Cir. 1999).
46
Id. at 665-66.
4
Id. at 667 (internal quotations omitted).
4s

Id.

See Wesby v. District of Columbia, 765 F.3d 13, 20 (D.C. Cir. 2014). A full discussion of this
case follows in Part IV: Development of the All-Elements Approach.
'0 See Jordan v. Mosley, 487 F.3d 1350, 1356 (11th Cir. 2007) ("[A]n arresting officer does not
need evidence of the intent for probable cause to arrest to exist."); United States v. Everett, 719
F.2d 1119, 1120 (11th Cir. 1983) (per curiam) ("While intent is an element of the crime which must
be proved at trial, it is not necessary in order to establish probable cause to arrest.").
61
196 F.3d 717 (7th Cir. 1999).
49
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against the proposition that "officers must establish probable cause as
to each and every element of a crime before they are authorized to
make an arrest." 52 In defense of this approach, the Spiegel court cited a
previous Seventh Circuit decision, which had in turn briefly cited the
"legal technicians" language of Brinegar without substantial
discussion.5 3 Notably, there was no discussion of specific evidence in
Spiegel. The court exclusively used the probable cause language. In
fact, the Seventh Circuit has recently adopted the some-elements
approach with more forceful language. 54
In recent years, the Fourth Circuit has indirectly adopted the
some-elements approach. In the Fourth Circuit's Cilman v. Reeves 55
decision, the plaintiff had brought an action alleging illegal search and
seizure. One issue on appeal was whether the jury instructions at the
trial level were correct. Plaintiff argued that the instructions should.
have been: "[Officer] must show by a preponderance of the evidence
that at the time he arrested plaintiff . .. he had probable cause for each
element of the offense." 56 The court concluded, however, that such
instruction was not needed, and that the district court's instructions
explaining probable cause as the "reasonable and prudent man"
The evolution of the some-elements approach is riddled with
inconsistencies. The entire progression of the some-elements approach
is founded upon a linguistic inconsistency. Much of the precedent for
the some-elements approach uses the term "specific evidence" rather
than "probable cause." It was not until the Gasho court switched the
language to "probable cause" that courts began exclusively using the
phrase "probable cause." As explained, Gasho provided no rationale for
this switch, which is troubling considering how influential Gasho has
been. Furthermore, Gasho offers another inconsistency by adopting a
specific intent gloss-a gloss that no other circuit has adopted. In light

"
1

Id. at 724 n.1.
See Tangwall v. Stuckey, 135 F.3d 510, 518-19 (7th Cir. 1998) (citing Brinegar
v. United
States, 338 U.S. 160, 176 (1949)).
5 Stokes v. Board of Educ. of the City of Chicago, 599 F.3d 617, 622-23 (7th Cir. 2010) ("To
form a belief of probable cause, an arresting officer is not required . . . to act as a judge or jury to
determine whether a person's conduct satisfies all of the essential elements of a particular
statute.").
452 F. App'x 263 (4th Cir. 2011).
5 Id. at 270.
Id. at 270-71 ("Probable cause to institute criminal proceedings against the plaintiff
existed if the facts and circumstances known to defendant and on which he acted were such that a

reasonable and prudent man acting on the same facts and circumstances would have believed the
plaintiff guilty.").

.

standard were "controlling law."5 7
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of these inconsistencies, it is no wonder that circuits soon offered a
competing interpretation.
IV. DEVELOPMENT OF THE ALL-ELEMENTS APPROACH
Within the last five years, three circuits have directly repudiated
the some-elements approach. In Williams v. City of Alexander,
Arkansas,5 8 the Eighth Circuit announced, "For probable cause to exist,
there must be probable cause for all elements of the crime, including
mens rea."5 9 The court's path to this decision is somewhat unclear.
60
Williams cites a previous Eighth Circuit opinion, Kuehl v. Burtis, in
which the court held that an officer who ignores evidence that negates
the mens rea of an alleged crime is not entitled to qualified immunity
for arrest without probable cause. 61 There is a significant difference,
however, between an officer ignoring evidence that negates an element,
and simply not having probable cause of said element. Element
negation is when an officer possesses direct evidence that the crime is
not being committed. Lack of probable cause is when an officer simply
lacks the sufficient, affirmative "hunch" needed to arrest. Thus, while
this Comment supports the Eighth Circuit's adoption of the allelements approach, the court's expansive reading of Kuehl is a
relatively weak basis for this move.
Similarly, in United States v. Joseph,62 the Third Circuit declared,
"To make an arrest based on probable cause, the arresting officer must
63
have probable cause for each element of the offense." In support of its
declaration, the court cited a previous Third Circuit case, Wright v. City
of Philadelphia.64 Wright never explicitly held, however, that officers
need to have probable cause for each element. The court instead
cryptically declared, "Whether any particular set of facts suggest that
an arrest is justified by probable cause requires an examination of the
elements of the crime at issue."65 The court then went on to assess
66
whether probable cause was present for each of the relevant elements,
which, likely in the Joseph court's view, was an implicit recognition
that officers need to have probable cause for each element of the crime.

58

772 F.3d 1307 (8th Cir. 2014).

"s Id. at 1312.
6
173 F.3d 646 (8th Cir. 1999).
61

Id. at 651.

62

730 F.3d 336 (3d Cir. 2014).
Id. at 342.
409 F.3d 595 (3d Cir. 2005).
Id. at 602.
Id. at 602-04.

63

65
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Recently, the D.C. Circuit further detailed the reasoning behind
the all-elements approach when it adopted the approach in Wesby v.
District of Columbia.67 There, the D.C. Circuit addressed whether
officers had probable cause to arrest a group of "partygoers" for
unlawful entry and disorderly conduct. 68 Citing first from Adams, the
court explained that "[p]robable cause 'does not require the same type
of specific evidence of each element of the offense as would be needed to
support a conviction.'"69 The court also announced, however, "the police
cannot establish probable cause without at least some evidence
supporting the elements of a particular offense, including the requisite
mental state."70 Since the officers lacked probable cause for the mens
rea element of unlawful entry, and since the officers had no evidence
that the partygoers were "disturb[ing] the tranquility and nighttime
slumber of the community residents"-an essential actus reus element
of disorderly conduct in the relevant jurisdiction-the court concluded
the officers lacked probable cause to arrest.7 1

In defense of its adoption of the all-elements approach, the Wesby
court cited United States v. Christian.72 Remember, however, that
Christian merely adopted Gasho's specific intent gloss to the someelements approach (i.e., for a specific intent crime, an officer must have
probable cause for the requisite mens rea).73 Nowhere in Christiandid
the court hold that an officer needs some evidence of each and every
element. The dissenting opinion from Wesby adds more weight to this
observation. Writing in dissent, Judge Janice Rogers Brown first
distinguished Christian, which only insisted on a showing of probable
cause for one element-specific intent. Judge Brown argued that
Christianis merely an adoption of Gasho's specific intent gloss, and in
no way supports the majority's opinion. 74 Overall, Brown objected to the
majority opinion because she believed it required not just probable
cause of each element, but specific evidence of each element. For
example, in distinguishing Christian, Judge Brown remarked, "The
problem with the government's argument in Christian was not the
absence of direct proof of criminal intent, it was the absence of any

70

71

765 F.3d 13 (D.C. Cir. 2014).
Id. at 19-24.
Id. at 20 (quoting Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 149 (1972)).
Id.
Id. at 24-25.

187 F.3d 663 (D.C. Cir. 1999).
7 Id. at 666-67.
74 Wesby, 765 F.3d at 32 (Brown, J., dissenting).
72
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evidence whatsoever of unlawful possession." 75 This is also why Brown
so easily concluded that the majority opinion "undercuts the ability of
officers to arrest suspects in the absence of direct, affirmative proof of a
culpable mental state; proof that must exceed a nebulous but
heightened sufficiency burden that the Court declines to specify." 76
Despite Brown's assessment, it seems likely that the majority
opinion was merely holding that an officer needs probable cause for
each element, not direct evidence. This is not to fault Brown's
assessment. Her confusion stems from the linguistic inconsistency that
precipitated the circuit split. Regardless, when the majority opinion
used the word "some" it likely did not mean "specific." Immediately
following its declaration that an officer needs at least "some" evidence
of each element, the majority states: "Because the offense of parading
without a permit, for example, requires knowledge that no permit
issued, 'officers who make such an arrest must have reasonable
grounds to believe' that the suspects knew no permit had been
granted."'7 7 In other words, the court immediately follows its use of the
word "some" with an example using the language "reasonable grounds,"
which is essentially "probable cause." As such, the majority likely
meant that an officer needs "probable cause" of each element of an
offense in order to have probable cause to arrest.
This interpretation also helps explain the Sixth Circuit's indirect
adoption of the all-elements approach. The Sixth Circuit's first steps
towards its indirect adoption occurred in Thacker v. City of Columbus.7 8

There, the court, building off its logic in Sevier, decided that arresting
officers do not need "proof" of each element of an offense to establish
probable cause. 79 The court reasoned, "The Fourth Amendment does
not require that a police officer know a crime occurred at the time the
officer arrests or searches a suspect .

. .

. The Fourth Amendment, after

all, necessitates an inquiry into probabilities, not certainty."8 0 It is
unclear what the Sixth Circuit meant by "proof." The court might have
meant that officers do not need "direct evidence" of each element. Yet,
the opinion's subsequent discussion of the elements of the crime at
issue indicates that the court's usage of "proof" most likely meant
probable cause.8 1

76
76

Id.
Id.

Id. at 20 (quoting Carr v. District of Columbia, 587 F.3d 401, 410-11 (D.C. Cir. 2009)).
328 F.3d 244 (6th Cir. 2003).
7 Id.
Id. (quoting United States v. Strickland, 144 F.3d 412, 415 (6th Cir. 1998) (internal
8
citations omitted)).
" See id. at 256-57.
77
7

PROBABLE CAUSE MEANS PROBABLE CAUSE

809]

821

Recently, however, the Sixth Circuit has elaborated further on its
probable cause standard. In United States v. Griffith,82 the court
recognized that "[a]lthough probable cause does not require proof of
each element of an offense, it does require a belief that the arrestee
'probably' committed the offense . . which obviously entails the
presence of each offense element." 83 It is likely that by "presence," the
court meant "probable cause." Preceding the court's use of "presence" is
an explanation that above all an officer must have a belief that the
crime is "probably" occurring. This emphasis on probability followed by
the language of "each element" is akin to the language used by those
courts adhering to the all-elements approach. Thus, this Comment
considers the Sixth Circuit as adhering to the all-elements approach.
The development of the some-elements approach is rooted in a
linguistic inconsistency between "specific evidence" and "probable
cause." And while the all-elements approach largely ignores this
linguistic inconsistency, the case that makes the strongest argument
for the all-elements approach-Wesby-is steeped with linguistic
ambiguity.
Despite this linguistic ambiguity, courts today are nonetheless
faced with two distinct choices. Recently, for example, the Tenth Circuit
in United States v. Argueta-Mejia84 noted that because of the circuit
split, it "lack[ed] precedential decisions on the necessity of probable
cause for each element of a suspected crime."8 5 Because of the lack of
precedential decisions, the court further concluded that the lower court
did not commit a clear or obvious error when it followed the allelements approach.8 6
V. ADOPTING THE ALL-ELEMENTS APPROACH

Argueta-Mejia demonstrates the importance of resolving this
circuit split. Regardless of linguistic inconsistencies and/or ambiguities,
there is a concern when a circuit court defers an issue because it lacks
clear guidance, especially when that deferring occurs in the criminal
law context. Furthermore, probable cause is a concept derived from the
protections of the Fourth Amendment of the United States

193 F. App'x 538 (6th Cir. 2006).
8 Id. at 541 (emphasis added) (quoting Thacker, 328 F.3d at 256 (citing BeVier v. Hucal, 806
F.2d 123, 126-27 (7th Cir. 1986) (explaining that the officer lacked probable cause when he lacked
knowledge as to the mens rea of the alleged offense and took no action to obtain such knowledge))).
615 F. App'x 485 (10th Cir. 2015).
Id. at 489-90.
8

'

Id. at 490.
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Constitution.8 7 Therefore, probable cause should have a nationally
uniform definition.8 8 A Supreme Court ruling on the issue is the easiest
route to this uniform definition. Adams arguably did more harm than
good, and since the decision, courts have had to wrestle with its
ambiguous language. 89 The Court seems hesitant, however, to provide
any sort of clarification. The closest the Supreme Court has come to
addressing the Adams issue was in a dissenting opinion nearly thirty
years ago. In Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 90 Justice Rehnquist
explained, "The standard for allowing a criminal case to proceed to trial
is not whether the government has produced prima facie evidence of
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt for every element of the offense, but
only whether it has established probable cause."91 Like Adams, Liberty
Lobby is silent on whether probable cause for a suspected offense can
exist without probable cause for every element of the suspected offense.
Since the Court has yet to reexamine the issue post-Liberty Lobby, it
seems doubtful that the Court will add clarification any time soon, and
a resolution of this issue must likely occur at the circuit level.
With this said, the circuit courts should uniformly adopt the allelements approach. Despite the lack of consistent reasoning among the
circuits that follow the all-elements approach, a broader analysis of
probable cause doctrine indicates that this interpretation is the most
logically sound. The circuit courts should uniformly adopt the allelements approach for five primary reasons: (1) the all-elements
approach better adheres to the widely held understanding of probable
cause as a measure of probability, (2) the all-elements approach aligns
with the nontechnical definition of probable cause established in
Supreme Court precedent, (3) the approach better balances the
competing interests of the Fourth Amendment, (4) the approach avoids
the linguistic inconsistency that precipitated the circuit split, and (5)
the policy concerns do not support the some-elements approach.

8 U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
' See, e.g., Laurent Sacharoff, Constitutional Trespass, 81 TENN. L. REV. 877, 914 (2014)
("[T]he Court has consistently assessed Fourth Amendment rules according to a national standard,
whether those are rules pertaining to probable cause, the need for a warrant, the power to arrest,
or ... whether conduct involves a search.") (internal citations omitted). But see Ronald J. Bacigal,
Making the Right Gamble: The Odds on Probable Cause, 74 MISS. L.J. 279, 323 (2004) ("The fiction
of one uniform definition of probable cause must be replaced with a flexible sliding scale that takes
account of the severity of the intrusion and the magnitude of the threat.").
89 See Argueta-Mejia, 615 F. App'x at n.8.
9
477 U.S. 242 (1986).
91 Id. at 271-72 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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The All-Elements Approach Better Adheres to the Widely Held
Understanding of Probable Cause as a Measure of Probability

Probable cause "is a fluid concept-turning on the assessment of
probabilities in particular factual contexts-not readily, or even
usefully, reduced to a neat set of legal rules." 92 Its existence must be
determined by an analysis of the totality of the circumstances
surrounding the alleged crime.9 3 The key word in the Supreme Court's
definition of probable cause is "probabilities." Because of the
nontechnical nature of probable cause, however, "the Supreme Court
has deemed probable cause 'incapable of precise definition or
quantification into percentages.' 94 Still, when federal judges were
asked to ascribe a percentage of certainty to probable cause, the
average response was thirty-one percent, and a majority of responses
were clustered in the range between thirty percent and sixty percent.9 5
Regardless of definition, the key point is that at its core, probable cause
is a probability assessment.9 6 The all-elements approach is the
approach that best adheres to the probabilistic understanding of
probable cause.
The absence of probable cause for any one element decreases the
total probability that the crime is being committed below the probable
cause threshold. Take, for example, the crime of possession of
prescription drugs with intent to distribute. In this hypothetical, the
crime has three elements: (1) possession of (2) a substantial quantity of
prescription drugs (3) with intent to distribute. The case is before a
judge that considers the probable cause threshold to be 30%. At the
time of arrest, the officer had 100% certainty that the defendant had
possession of prescription drugs. Furthermore, the officer had 100%
certainty that the defendant had a substantial quantity of prescription
drugs. Yet, if the officer has just 29.9% certainty that the defendant
intends to distribute the prescription drugs, the probability of all three
elements of the crime simultaneously occurring is less than the judge's
purported probable cause threshold (100% x 100% x 29.9%= 29.9%).

"

Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 232 (1983).
Id. at 238.
94
Goldberg, supra note 16, at 790 (quoting Maryland v. Pringle, 540 U.S. 366, 371 (2003)).
But see Lerner, supra note 15 (arguing that probable cause jurisprudence is based not on
probability, but on reasonableness).
9 Goldberg, supra note 16, at 801 (citing C.M.A. McCauliff, Burdens of Proof: Degrees of
Belief, Quanta of Evidence, or Constitutional Guarantees?,35 VAND. L. REV. 1293, 1324-25, 1328
(1982)).
9
See, e.g., Pringle, 540 U.S. at 370-71 (Probable cause is "a fluid concept-turning on the
assessment of probabilities in particular factual contexts . . . .") (quoting Gates, 462 U.S. at 232).
1
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Thus, under this basic mathematical understanding, the officer did not
have probable cause to arrest.
By not requiring probable cause for every element, the someelements approach drastically deviates from the basic probability
assessment of probable cause. Under the some-elements approach, our
hypothetical officer would have probable cause to arrest even though
the entire probable cause calculation is below the probable cause
threshold. Conversely, the all-elements approach maintains logical
consistency with this mathematical understanding. Under the allelements approach, when an officer lacks probable cause for any
element, he lacks probable cause for the entire crime.
There is some limit to this mathematical argument. First, the
Supreme Court has consistently cited Brinegar for the proposition that
probable cause involves probability assessments, but that these
probability assessments must be "non-technical." Perhaps the allelements approach is somewhat technical, then. Ultimately, however,
law enforcement's intuitions on probability inform this mathematical
understanding. Furthermore, an officer may satisfy the all-elements
approach even if the first element, if it were examined standing alone,
is not at the probable cause threshold. Take, for example, the crime of
kidnapping. Some kidnapping statutes have two actus reus elements:
(1) unlawful seizure of a child, and (2) holding said child for ransom or
reward.9 7 Because the second element indicates a near certainty that
the first element occurred, satisfaction of the second element bumps the
first element past the probable cause threshold-again, even if
examined standing alone, there was only a twenty-five percent chance
that element one was occurring.
There is a second limit to this mathematical understanding of
probable cause. Imagine if an officer has probable cause for each
element, but that the probable cause assessment for each element is
right on the cusp at thirty percent. Calculating under this scenario
would make it seem that the officer lacks probable cause to arrest
(30.0% x 30.0% x 30.0% = 2.7%). But that can't be. Law enforcement
would be severely hampered if probable cause could not be established
even if an officer had probable cause for every element. It is likely,
then, that when an officer establishes she had probable cause for an
element, a judge would think of the figure as a fixed "one." So the
probable cause calculation would look like 1 x 1 x 1 = 1. In practice,
judges are not actually calculating this math, but conceptually, this is
possibly what is occurring in a judge's head.

9
See 18 U.S.C. § 1201; see also Brika v. United States, No. 2:08-cv-877, 2010 WL 3258558,
at *19 (S.D. Ohio Aug. 17, 2010).
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The All-Elements Approach Aligns with the Nontechnical
Definition of Probable Cause Established in Supreme Court
Precedent

In Brinegar, the Court acknowledged that when courts -deal with
probable cause, they "deal with probabilities. These are not
technical. . . ."98 One legal basis for the some-elements approach is that
it better aligns with Brinegar and the Supreme Court's nontechnical
standard for probable cause. For example, the Seventh Circuit
rationalized its adoption of the some-elements approach by citing the
nontechnical language of Brinegar.99 True, any interpretation of
probable cause must align with the fluid, nontechnical definition
established in Brinegar and Gates. The Court, in fact, in discussing its
probable cause jurisprudence, recently affirmed its long rejection of
"rigid rules, bright-line tests, and mechanistic inquiries in favor of a
more flexible, all-things-considered approach."1 0 0 In doing so, the Court
lamented "the development of a list of 'inflexible, independent
requirements applicable in every case."'10 1
No court following the some-elements approach, however, has ever
explained why requiring probable cause for each element would be a
"technical" standard. This is important, as it is not sufficiently clear
whether such requirement would be "technical" in the sense that the
Supreme Court has used the term. Troubling too is that the caselaw
and secondary sources rarely define what "technical" means in this.
sense. The Brinegar Court acknowledged that any probable cause
inquiry must "deal with probabilities," but described the approach as
''not technical . . . [and based on] the factual and practical
considerations of everyday life on which reasonable and prudent
men . .. act." 102 With Brinegar's use of the phrase "everyday life on
which reasonable and prudent men . .. act," the Court likely meant

nontechnical as "a definition capable of comprehension by the
individuals the [Fourth] Amendment was meant to protect." 103 It is no
stretch to imagine the citizens of the United States comprehending a
standard that requires probable cause for each element of an offense. In
fact, this might make more intuitive sense to the average citizen.
Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175 (1949).
Spiegel v. Cortese, 196 F.3d 717, 724 n.1 (7th Cir. 1999).
100 Florida v. Harris, 133 S. Ct. 1050, 1055-56 (2013).
10]
Id. at 1056 (quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 230 n.6 (1983)).
02 Brinegar, 338 U.S. at 175.
'o3 See Lisa Tuenge Hale, United States v. Ford: The Eleventh Circuit Permits Unrestricted
Police Use of Thermal Surveillance on Private Property Without a Warrant, 29 GA. L. REV. 819, 847
(1995).
8
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United States v. Cortez104 is also instructive here. In emphasizing
the probability aspect of probable cause, the Court noted, "[T]he
evidence thus collected [for a probable cause assessment] must be seen
and weighed not in terms of library analysis by scholars, but as
1 05
Even
understood by those versed in the field of law enforcement."
under this nontechnical understanding of probable cause, the allelements approach passes muster. Requiring probable cause for each
element is merely making officers conduct an extension of an
assessment with which they are already familiar. Moreover, it merely
requires officers to conduct the assessment with "non-technical,"
common-sense math. Ultimately, the Brinegar definition is simply
106
concerned with determining probable cause on a case-by-case basis.
Requiring probable cause for each element still requires such case-bycase application.
Nevertheless, one analogous Supreme Court decision might
support the some-elements approach in this regard. In Illinois v.
Gates,10 the Supreme Court rejected the rigid two-pronged AguilarSpinelli test for determining whether an informant's tip establishes
probable cause. 10s The Court collapsed the two requirements-veracity
109
The
and reliability-into a "totality-of-the-circumstances" approach.
Aguilar-Spinelli test derived from the Supreme Court's decisions in
Aguilar v. State of Texas 1 o and Spinelli v. United States.1 1 ' A number
of state courts and lower federal courts "understood Spinelli as
requiring that [an] anonymous [tip] satisfy each of two independent
1 12
According to this
requirements before it [can] be relied on."
understanding, a tip first has to "adequately reveal the 'basis of
knowledge' of the letter writer." 113 Second, it has to "provide facts
sufficiently establishing either the 'veracity' of the . . . informant, or,
104

449 U.S. 411 (1981).

Id. at 418.
See Maryland v. Pringle, 540 U.S. 366, 371 (2003) ('The 'substance of all the definitions of
probable cause is a reasonable ground for belief of guilt,' and that the belief of guilt must be
particularized with respect to the person to be searched or seized.") (emphasis added) (citations
omitted) (quoting Brinegar, 338 U.S. at 175).
10s
100

107

*
109

462 U.S. 213 (1983).

Id. at 230-31.
Id. at 233.

378 U.S. 108 (1964) (holding that search warrant affidavit may be based on hearsay
information but magistrate judge must be informed of some of the underlying circumstances on
which informant based her conclusions and some of the underlying circumstances from which
officer concluded that informant was credible).
". 393 U.S. 410 (1969) (holding that search warrant affidavit must (1) inform magistrate
judge of underlying circumstances to enable her to independently judge validity of informant's tip,
and (2) must show informant was credible or her information was reliable).
112
Gates, 462 U.S. at 228.
10

113 Id. at 228.
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alternatively, the 'reliability' of the informant's report." 1 14 In Gates, the
Court agreed that an informant's veracity, reliability, and basis of
knowledge were all relevant in determining the value of his report.1 15
Nevertheless, the Court announced, "[T]hese elements should [not] be
understood as entirely separate and independent requirements to be
rigidly exacted in every case." 116 The Court instead adopted a totalityof-the-circumstances approach, where "a deficiency in one [factor] may
be compensated for, in determining the overall reliability of a tip, by a
strong showing as to the other."11 7
The Gates Court reasoned that such an approach was more in line
with the Supreme Court's nontechnical definition of probable cause.
The Court noted that "[r]igid legal rules are ill-suited [for probable
cause]," and "[o]ne simple rule will not cover every situation."1 18 Thus,
one might extend the Court's reasoning in Gates to probable cause in
general. Since probable cause is a nontechnical, totality of the.
circumstances standard, should a strong showing of other elements
compensate for the absence of one element of an alleged offense? Not
necessarily. The elements of reliability and veracity are in relation to
the informant. These elements have little to do with the alleged
offender. Of course the more reliable and verifiable an informant's
account is, the more probable it is that the alleged criminal actually
committed the crime. Collapsing the elements of reliability and veracity
into a totality of circumstances test, however, does little to affect the
probability that the alleged offender committed the crime. Conversely,
when one or more elements are not at the probable cause level, the
overall probability that the alleged offender committed the crime is
below the probable cause threshold. 119
The some-elements approach's interpretation of Brinegar is
ultimately a strained reading of the opinion. If Brinegar and its
progeny stand for anything, it is merely that probable cause should not
be defined as a concrete, formulaic standard without flexibility to apply
in various situations. 120 Furthermore, if probable cause means

1
11
116

Id. at 228-29.
Id. at 230.
Id.

.. Id. at 233.

Id. at 232 (quoting Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 147 (1972)).
See supra Part V, Section A: The All-Elements Approach Better Adheres to the Widely
Held Understanding of Probable Cause as a Measure of Probability.
12o See, e.g., Drey Cooley, Clearly Erroneous Review
is Clearly Erroneous: Reinterpreting
1

Illinois v. Gates and Advocating De Novo Review for a Magistrate's Determination of Probable
Cause in Applications for Search Warrants, 55 DRAKE L. REV. 85, 107 (2006) ("Gates was
concerned that the determination of probable cause was becoming increasingly rigid, requiring
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anything, it means that there is a sufficient probability that the crime
is happening. 121 Probable cause is a probability standard above all else.
Forcing officers to credibly establish probable cause for each element
prior to arrest is not imposing some technical standard that prevents
application to various circumstances. The all-elements approach merely
conforms to the basic definition of probable cause. Again, this talk of
non-mechanical and nontechnical is completely irrelevant if a court is
giving a definition to probable cause that frustrates the basic essence of
its probability assessment.
C.

The All-Elements Approach Better Balances the Competing
Interests of the Fourth Amendment

Probable cause is a concept derived from the protections of the
Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution. 12 2 Historically,
courts have recognized two competing interests the Framers had in
mind when they drafted the Amendment. First, "[the Fourth]
Amendment reflects the recognition of the Framers that certain
enclaves should be free from arbitrary government interference." 1 23 The
Amendment is seen as a "limitation[ ] on the power of the sovereign to
infringe on the liberty of the citizen."1 24 Accordingly, the Fourth
Amendment reflects the citizens' interest in their privacy. Second, the
Fourth Amendment also reflects the State's security interest in
maintaining law and order. 125 The Framers "struck a balance so that
when the State's reason to believe incriminating evidence will be found
becomes sufficiently great, the invasion of privacy becomes justified." 126
Indeed, "[t]he long-prevailing standard of probable cause protects
citizens from rash and unreasonable interferences with privacy and
from unfounded charges of crime, while giving fair leeway for enforcing
the law for the community's protection." 1 2 7

.

magistrates to perform virtual formulaic calculations to determine the existence of probable cause.
In other words, probable cause determinations were becoming increasingly technical instead of
being based on commonsense probability assessments.").
2' See United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 418 (1981) ("The [probable cause assessment]
does not deal with hard certainties, but with probabilities."); see also United States v. Gazzara,
587 F. Supp. 311, 317 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) ("Above all, probable cause deals with probabilities . .
(quoting Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175 (1949)).
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
12
Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 178 (1984).
123
1
Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 230 (1976) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
125
See, e.g., Maryland v. Pringle, 540 U.S. 366, 370 (2003).
Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 400 (1976).
126
127 Pringle, 540 U.S. at 370 (quoting Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 176 (1949)).
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1. The all-elements approach better protects citizens' privacy
interest.
The approach that courts take to probable cause will influence the
balance between the government's security interest and the citizen's
privacy interest. As the probable cause standard is defined as more
nontechnical and less rigid, the government interest begins to
supersede the private citizens' interest. 128 Such supersession is not
completely unwanted. When there is evidence of wrongdoing, the
government interest in detaining criminals should undoubtedly
outweigh the citizen's interest in her privacy. 129 Concerning, however,
is a standard that from the start inherently allows the government
interest to supersede the private citizens' interest.
Under the some-elements approach, the prosecution can more
easily meet its burden of establishing probable cause. Such a result is
troubling since the Supreme Court tends to reject rules that make it
inherently easier and cheaper to establish probable cause. 130 The Court
has reasoned that such rules often "promot[e] law enforcement
interests at the expense of individual privacy, unsettling the balance
struck by the Fourth Amendment." 131 As Justice Brennan's dissent in
Gates also makes clear, such rules often "obliterate one of the most
fundamental distinctions between our form of government, where
officers are under the law, and the police-state where they are the
law." 132
This fear of inherent supersession by the government played a role
in the development of the all-elements approach. In Joseph, for
example, the Third Circuit reasoned that by requiring probable cause
for every element, the government must make distinct legal arguments
for each element of a crime, and cannot make blanket probable cause
arguments. 133 In short, the court recognized the fundamental role that
courts must play in balancing the competing interests at stake. There is
an implicit concern for supersession in this recognition. By requiring
probable cause for each element, the government must support its
Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 290 (1983) (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("Words such as
practical,' 'nontechnical,' and 'commonsense,' as used in the Court's opinion, are but code words
for an overly permissive attitude towards police practices in derogation of the rights secured by the
Fourth Amendment.").
1'
See Fisher, 425 U.S. at 400 ("[W]hen the State's reason to believe incriminating evidence
will be found becomes sufficiently great, the invasion of privacy becomes justified.").
..
o See Simon Stern, Constructive Knowledge, Probable Cause, and Administrative
Decisionmaking, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1085, 1090-91 (2007).
' Id.
2 Gates, 462 U.S. at 291 (quoting Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 17 (1948)).
.. United States v. Joseph, 730 F.3d 336, 342 (3d Cir. 2013).
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probable cause determination with great detail, thus minimizing the
risk of inherent supersession. Overall, then, the all-elements approach
better protects citizens' interest in their privacy.
2. The all-elements approach protects the state's security interest.
A major reason for the development of the some-elements approach
was the view that requiring probable cause for each element would
frustrate law enforcement even when conducting warranted searches.
In Sevier, for example, the Sixth Circuit adopted the some-elements
approach for this exact reason. 134 But this decision only makes sense
when considering the procedural background of Sevier. There, the court
was defining probable cause in a warrant context. Historically, courts
have been willing to apply a more state-friendly probable cause
standard when police officers seek warrants, reasoning that the
warrant request process itself serves as a strong check against
government overreach. 135 As mentioned, courts seek to disturb, as little
as possible, the balance between the Fourth Amendment's competing
interests. In a warrant context, the citizen's concern for privacy has an
initial layer of protection in the warrant requirement. Adding another
protective layer by making the probable cause standard harder to meet
could result in an imbalance that hampers important law enforcement
efforts.
In a warrantless context, however, the citizen's interest in her
privacy does not have an initial buffer. We should therefore be less
concerned with hampering law enforcement efforts. Furthermore,
notwithstanding the competing interests doctrine discussed above, the
Framers ultimately drafted the Fourth Amendment as a shield against
unwarranted government interference with individual autonomy. 136 In
other words, although the Fourth Amendment encapsulates two
interests, the Framers crafted the language to err on the side of
protecting individual autonomy against increased state power. It would
be quite antithetical to the Framers' intentions if the standard
developed in light of the Fourth Amendment were crafted with an eye
to a sword. With the Amendment's shield purpose in mind, courts

United States v. Sevier, 539 F.2d 599, 603 (6th Cir. 1976).
See, e.g., United States v. Moore, 956 F.2d 843, 855 (8th Cir. 1992); United States v. Frank,
864 F.2d 992, 997 (3d Cir. 1988); Zweibon v. Mitchell, 516 F.2d 594, 630 n.91 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
136
See Thomas Y. Davies, Recovering the Original Fourth Amendment, 98 MICH. L. REV. 547,
556 (1999) ("[T]he larger purpose for which the Framers adopted the [Fourth Amendment was] to
curb the exercise of discretionary authority by [police] officers."); Anthony G. Amsterdam,
Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REV. 349, 411-12 (1974) (arguing that
searches and seizures conducted at the discretion of executive officials motivated the Framers'
drafting of the Fourth Amendment).
'a

135
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should not define probable cause in state-friendly terms simply to avoid
law enforcement frustration.
Regardless, the all-elements approach is not likely to frustrate
legitimate law enforcement. Uniform adoption of the all-elements
approach might conversely create a newfound level of trust between the
citizenry and the state, and in turn lead to more effective policing. A
more state-friendly probable
cause standard, in fact, might
cumulatively result in less effective policing. As unjustified arrests
increase in a community, the level of distrust and apprehension
between citizen and police tends to rise. 137 Conversely, as a
community's trust in its police increases, more effective policing
results. 138 Individuals who respect the police are more likely to accept
authority and be deterred from committing crimes. 139 Furthermore,
there is an increased likelihood that individuals will cooperate with the
police and assist in investigations when they feel they are being treated
fairly. 140 Because the all-elements approach makes it inherently more
difficult to conduct an unjustified arrest, such an increase in police
effectiveness would theoretically occur under a national adoption of the
approach.
Additionally, there are two aspects of the all-elements approach
that minimize its perceived burden on law enforcement. First, in the
civil law context, an adequate use of arguable probable cause minimizes
this perceived burden. To receive qualified immunity in a Section 1983
action, "an officer need not have actual probable cause, but only
'arguable' probable cause." 141 Arguable probable cause exists where
"reasonable officers in the same circumstances and possessing the same
knowledge as the [actual officers] could have believed that probable
cause existed to arrest." 142 In Scarbrough v. Myles, 143 the Eleventh
Circuit held that "[a]rguable probable cause does not require an
arresting officer to prove every element of a crime or to obtain a
confession before making an arrest, which would negate the concept of

L. Ren et al., Linking Confidence in the Police with the Performance of The Police:
Community Policing Can Make a Difference, 33 J. CRIM. JUST. 55, 62 (2005) (finding that
137

"victimization experiences tend to reduce confidence in the police").
138

Id. ("Confidence in the police [can] be used ...

as one alternative measurement of officers'

effectiveness.").
13 Wesley Skogan & Kathleen Fryd1, Police Fairness:Legitimacy as the Consent of the
Public
in Fairnessand Effectiveness, in POLICING: THE EVIDENCE 217, 250 (Nat'1 Academies Press, 2004).
140
Id.
141 Grider v. City of Auburn, Ala., 618 F.3d 1240, 1257 (11th
Cir. 2010).
142
143

Id.
245 F.3d 1299 (11th Cir. 2011).
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probable cause and transform arresting officers into prosecutors." 1 4 4
Proponents of the some-elements approach claim that requiring
probable cause for each element-especially the mens rea elementswould result in actual criminals getting off the hook, since officers
would fear misperceiving the arrestee's mens rea and thus
overcompensate by not seeking arrest. 145 This argument fails to realize
that officers do not work in a legal gray area under the all-elements
approach. Even if an officer makes a slight mistake regarding mens rea,
arguable probable cause will save the officer from civil liability.
Consequently, the officer will be less afraid to trust his instincts.
Second, in the criminal law context, the all-elements approach
minimizes the perceived burden by allowing officers to establish
probable cause for mens rea using the slightest circumstantial evidence
or by even "piggy-backing" off an established actus reus element. 146
Courts under the all-elements approach reason that since "police
officers are not . . . 'legal technicians,' the probable cause standard

must allow police officers to make educated guesses." 147 If "the police
ultimately find . . . no evidence of the criminal activity they were
looking for . .. then the [probable cause] standard . .. provide[s] room

for courts to defer to a police officer's expertise."1 48 The strength of such
reasoning is bolstered by the fact that at least four circuits have
acknowledged that because "the practical restraints on police in the
field are greater with respect to ascertaining intent .

.

. the latitude

accorded to officers considering the probable cause issue in the context
of mens rea crimes must be correspondingly great." 149
A return to the prescription drug hypothetical further illuminates
this point. 150 Assume the officer found no direct evidence establishing
intent to distribute. This does not mean the officer lacked probable

Id. at 1302-03.
See, e.g., Wesby v. District of Columbia, 765 F.3d 13, 35 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (Brown, J.,
dissenting).
146 See, e.g., Voicenet Communications, Inc. v. Corbett, No. 04-1318, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
95619, at *31 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 13, 2010) ("The inference of intent could be inferred through some act
performed by the criminal suspect, such as the act of attempting to download images of child
pornography through a specified IP address or the act of joining a child pornography website or
"

145

email group.").

Goldberg, supra note 16, at 799 (quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 231 (1983)).
Id. at 799-800 (citing Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 700 (1996)).
14
141 Zalaski v. City of Hartford, 723 F.3d 382, 393 (2d Cir. 2013) (citing Cox v. Hainey, 391 F.3d
25, 34 (1st Cir. 2004)); see also Conner v. Heiman, 672 F.3d 1126, 1132 (9th Cir. 2012) (observing
that whether inference of innocent intent "was also reasonable, or even more reasonable, does not
matter so long as the [culpable intent] conclusion was itself reasonable"); Paff v. Kaltenbach, 204
F.3d 425, 437 (3d Cir. 2000) (recognizing that arresting officers must make judgment calls in
determining suspect's state of mind).
15o Remember, this hypothetical crime has three elements: (1) possession of (2) a substantial
quantity of prescription drugs (3) with intent to distribute.
147
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cause to arrest. If a reasonable officer would conclude that when
elements one and two are at 100% and the alleged crime is occurring in
a high-crime area, element three is almost always at the probable cause
level, the court would conclude that the officer had probable cause to
arrest (assuming our hypothetical occurred in a high-crime area, the
probable cause calculation is above the 30% threshold mentioned above
because the third element is now above 29.9% (100% x 100% x 30%=
30%). The all-elements approach does not require direct evidence of
each element, only a sufficient probability that an officer will find direct
evidence following arrest. Thus, rather than decreasing law
enforcement's effectiveness, the all-elements approach allows flexibility
in law enforcement practices while maintaining a logical consistency
with the probability aspect of probable cause.
D.

The All-Elements Approach Avoids the Linguistic Inconsistency
that Precipitated the Circuit Split

As mentioned, a major reason for the circuit split is a simple
linguistic inconsistency at the circuit level. Post-Adams, courts began
interchangeably using "probability" and "specific evidence" to describe
their probable cause standards. The some-elements approach is largely
driven by a perception that requiring probable cause for each element
would also require specific evidence of each element. Likewise, the
development of the all-elements approach is largely a response to this
perception. To adherents of the all-elements approach, probable cause
is a standard that requires probability of each element but not specific
evidence of each element or even knowledge that the specific crime
allegedly occurred.
The all-elements approach is the correct interpretation on this
matter. The Supreme Court has never contemplated a bright-line
requirement of specific evidence of each element. Only holdings at the
circuit and district level interchange "probable cause" for each element
with "specific evidence" of each element. Ultimately, the all-elements
approach largely avoids this linguistic inconsistency altogether. Courts
under the approach have consistently used the language of "probable
cause" or "presence of evidence" when describing their probable cause
standard.151

Courts adhering to the all-elements approach, however, could
undoubtedly tighten their language. As evidenced by the D.C. Circuit's
Wesby decision, the use of "presence," while not technically a "linguistic
inconsistency," leads to some ambiguity. Although this Comment
151

See supra Part IV: Development of the All-Elements Approach.
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supports the idea that "presence" most certainly means "probable
cause," district courts interpreting Wesby's use of the word might not be
as quick to adopt this interpretation.
Ultimately, the all-elements approach and its ambiguous use of the
word "presence" still trumps the linguistic inconsistency of the someelements approach. This is because a general understanding of the
language at play indicates that above all, courts' use of "presence" does
not mean "specific evidence." Merriam-Webster defines "presence" as
"the fact or condition of being present." In turn, present is defined as
"being in view or at hand." Conversely, Merriam-Webster's third
definition of "specific" is "free from ambiguity." There is little doubt
which phrasing is more akin to probable cause. The entire probable
cause calculation is one rooted in ambiguity. The use of "specific
evidence," then, is counter to our understanding of probable cause.
Additionally, "being in view or at hand" is a phrase very similar to the
sort of on-the-spot assessments we task officers with in their probable
cause calculations. Thus, although courts following the all-elements
approach could undoubtedly tighten their language, their use of
"presence" or "probable cause" is inherently more likely to avoid
linguistic confusion at the district level.
The Policy Concerns Do Not Support the Some-Elements Approach

E.

Finally, the policy concerns raised by proponents of the someelements approach do not trump the positive aspects of the all-elements
approach this Comment has addressed above. One such argument
claims that requiring probable cause for every element will only
exacerbate unjustified litigation and waste precious state resources,
with no counterbalancing positive effect on law enforcement's ability to
conduct its affairs. This theory analogizes to the recent trend in civil
litigation wherein frivolous lawsuits are bolstered by more plaintiff
friendly laws.1 52 Thus, one might argue that requiring probable cause
53
for each element will exacerbate frivolous Section 1983 actions1 in the
civil law realm. When an officer must prove probable cause for every
element, plaintiffs can more easily state a cause of action by claiming
that an element was not at the probable cause threshold prior to arrest.
In turn, as the number of these Section 1983 actions increases, police

See, e.g., Macklin Fleming, Court Survival in the Litigation Explosion, 54 JUDICATURE
109 (1970).
153
42 U.S.C. § 1983; see also Jack M. Beerman, Why Do Plaintiffs Sue Private Parties Under
Section 1983?, 26 CARDozo L. REV. 9, 9 (2004) ("Section 1983 provides a cause of action against
'any person' who, while acting 'under color of' state law, subjects or causes the plaintiff to be
subjected to a violation of federal constitutional or statutory rights.").
152
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officers will become more hesitant on the job, resulting in a decrease in
police effectiveness. 154
One might also apply this reasoning to the criminal law context.
When an officer must have probable cause for each element, a
defendant can more easily penetrate the state's prosecution by
asserting affirmative defenses that probable cause was not met for one
or several elements. As criminal defense attorneys become more
competent at this practice, state resources will be wasted on formerly
open-and-shut cases. As state and local budgets have become more
strained in recent years because of economic downturn, law
enforcement and judicial bodies have been charged with keeping the
peace in the most cost-effective manner possible. 155 By forcing the state
to waste resources on all of these frivolous defenses, state and local
legislatures will either have to find money elsewhere or cut other
programs within the law enforcement budget.
The problem with these arguments, however, is that they might
apply to any area of law enforcement reform. Many credible plans to
reshape American law enforcement will either require increased state
or local funding, or have the negative consequence of increasing
frivolous litigation. Such arguments are too quick to ignore the positive
aspects of the all-elements approach. When product liability first came
to the forefront of tort litigation, for example, critics could have cited
similar arguments. The positive effects of cost shifting to the least cost
avoider, however, made it abundantly clear that the positive effects
have trumped the negative. 156 Just as there are still frivolous tort
actions, there will undoubtedly be frivolous Section 1983 actions. Even
so, there is no empirical evidence to show that slightly increasing the
burden on police officers will increase the number of these actions. The
all-elements approach is merely changing the fact that a judge at the
dismissal stage would look at each element rather than the crime-in-

114
See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 814 (1982) (noting that the "fear of being sued will
dampen the ardor of all but the most resolute, or the most irresponsible [public officials], in the
unflinching discharge of their duties"); see also Barbara E. Armacost, Qualified Immunity:
Ignorance Excused, 51 VAND. L. REV. 583, 586 (1998) ("[Section 1983's] unbalanced incentive

structure may drive officials toward inaction, underenforcement, delay and other defensive tactics

that limit their personal costs but disadvantage the public.").
'
See John Gibeaut, The Good Fight Gets Harder:As Legislatures Cut Prosecutors'Budgetsto
the Bone, Caseloads Are Backing Up, and Fewer Young Attorneys Are Choosing to Stay, 90 A.B.A.
J. 41, 43 (Feb. 2004) (explaining that local law enforcement budgets are strained even during boom
periods).
'" See, e.g., Richard E. Speidel, Warranty Theory, Economic Loss, and the Privity
Requirement: Once More Into the Void, 67 B.U. L. REV. 9, 21-22 (1987) (describing traditional
bases of strict products liability as cost shifting and promotion of safety).
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the-abstract when determining whether the plaintiff has a credible
cause of action against the law enforcement agency or officer.
Furthermore, it is simply not true that requiring probable cause for
each element will place a significant financial strain on state and local
law enforcement bodies. As in the civil context, the all-elements
approach is merely shifting a judge's focus. Rather than viewing the
crime in the abstract, a judge will now look at each element to assess a
defendant's challenge that probable cause was not established. In an
age of burgeoning government expenditures, a simple shift of focus
might negligibly affect budgets. Moreover, if any, the slight strain it
would cause might be cost-justified in light of the likely increase in
police effectiveness when the community's trust in the police
increases.157
VI. CONCLUSION

One might ultimately call this circuit split "simple." It is, after all,
a simple matter of language that largely prevents a uniform approach.
The split might also be called simple because the resolution seems so
clear. The courts must simply strive to reach a probable cause standard
that balances the competing interests of the Fourth Amendment, while
maintaining logical consistency with the fluid, nontechnical definition
of probable cause established in Brinegar and Gates. Today, however,
the circuits cite various legal and policy rationales to justify their
different interpretations of Adams, and a resolution is not as simple as
it might initially seem. Nevertheless, such a resolution is needed, and
ultimately, the ideal uniform approach is the all-elements approach.
This Comment detailed several reasons for why the all-elements
approach is the ideal uniform approach. Ultimately, the issue can be
sufficiently solved with this Comment's first rationale: The all-elements
approach better adheres to the "probability" aspect of probable cause.
The key word in the Supreme Court's definition of probable cause is
"probabilities." Again, all the talk of non-mechanical and non-technical
is completely irrelevant if a court is giving a definition to probable
cause that frustrates the basic essence of its probability assessment.
When probable cause for any element is unsatisfied the entire probable
cause calculation is not met.
Thus, rather than decreasing law enforcement's effectiveness, the
all-elements approach allows flexibility in law enforcement practices
while maintaining a logical consistency with the probability aspect of
probable cause. The current rationales for the some-elements approach
cannot overcome the fact that the approach fundamentally distorts this
157

L. Ren et al., supra note 137.
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probability aspect. Until either the courts or further scholarship
address this issue head on, it seems well settled. The circuit courts
should uniformly adopt the all-elements approach.

